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Abstract Legal probabilism is the view that juridical fact-finding should be mod-
eled using Bayesian methods. One of the alternatives to it is the narration view,
according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of com-
peting narrations of what (allegedly) happened. The goal of this paper is to develop
a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Baye-
sian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.
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1 Legal probabilism and narrations
Legal Probabilism (LP) is the view that the legal notion of probability is to be governed
by the mathematical principles of standard probability theory, and that the decision
process in juridical fact-finding is to be modeled by means of probabilistic tools.
LP comes in various shapes. It is one thing to say that the standards of juridical
proof are to be explicated in probabilistic terms, it is another to provide such an
explication. For instance, of such explications is the Classical Legal Probabilism
(CLP) (Bernoulli 1713), according to which the decision rule given a certain
probability of guilt threshold t is:1
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1 Four remarks. First, normally, the assumption that t is constant between cases is unnecessary. It
definitely changes between the civil and the criminal cases, and might change depending on what’s at
stake at a given case. Second, for somewhat different explications which lie beyond the scope of this
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(CLP) If the probability of guilt conditional on all the evidence is above t, convict;
otherwise acquit.
The debate about LP started in the sixties2 and continued for quite a few years,3
leading to a careful level of acceptance of some probabilistic methods in court of
law.4 In the process, however, many arguments have been put forward to the effect
that the models offered by LP are either inadequate or unhelpful.5 Some, such as
those put forward by Cohen, consisted in raising conceptual difficulties and
paradoxes related to the application of probability theory in legal contexts. Quite a
few objections raised by Cohen have not been successfully answered.6 Some
arguments focused on the fact that LP is blind to various phenomena that an
adequate philosophical account of legal fact-finding should explain. Some of them
pertain to procedural issues (Stein 2005)—proceedings are back-and-forth between
opposing parties, cross-examination is crucial, and yet CLP seems to take no notice
of this dynamics. Some have to do with reasoning methods which are not only
evidence-to-hypothesis, but also hypotheses-to-evidence (Wells 1992; Allen and
Pardo 2007) and involve inference to the best explanation (Dant 1988).
A seemingly competing account, which, arguably, is not blind to those aspects of
fact-finding, and is not susceptible to Cohen-style paradoxes, has been put forward.
It is the No Plausible Alternative Story (NPAS) theory (Allen 2010), according to
which the courtroom is a confrontation of competing narrations offered by the
defendant and by the prosecutor and the theory to be selected7 should be the most
plausible one. On the narrative approach the fact-finding proceedings are seen as an
interplay of evidence and various stories of crime presented by opposing parties and
the assessment of their relative plausibility plays a crucial role in the court’s
decision (Ho 2008). That is, NPAS offers the following rule of decision:
(NPAS) Once all the plausible alternative narrations have been ruled out by the
evidence presented, pick the one remaining narration, and if it entails
guilt, convict, or else acquit.
Footnote 1 continued
paper see for instance Cheng (2012) or Kaplow (2014). Third, note also that the view is called classical
deservedly. Nowadays, many scholars who embrace the use of probabilistic methods in court and the
requirement that uncertain reasoning in court should be probabilistically coherent, do not claim that there
is a guilt probability threshold. Fourth, in what follows I’ll speak as if I was talking about the criminal
standard only. What will be said, though, applies, mutatis mutandis, to civil cases as well.
2 See Ball (1960), Kaplan (1968), Cullison (1969), Simon and Mahan (1970), Lempert (1977), Kaye
(1979).
3 See for instance Tillers and Green (1988).
4 Stein (2005), Ho (2008), Aitken et al. (2010)
5 See for example Tribe (1971a, b), Cohen (1977), Underwood (1977), Nesson (1979), Cohen (1981),
Dant (1988), Wells (1992), Stein (2005), Allen and Pardo (2007), Ho (2008), Haack (2014b).
6 A detailed discussion of Cohen’s objections is beyond the scope of the paper. My goal now is to put
forward a positive proposal; a discussion of how it relates to Cohen’s arguments is postponed to another
paper.
7 Throughout the paper I use narration, story and theory interchangeably.
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One advantage of this view is that it is suggested by psychological evidence
(Pennington and Hastie 1991, 1992, 1993). Fact-finders in court indeed construct
their own crime narratives from the evidence. Second, the approach is better at
capturing the already listed phenomena that CLP is claimed to be blind to. Third,
given that evidence is often somewhat scattered, it seems conceptually adequate to
try to put it together by means of a narration.8 Fourth, NPAS seems to be able to
handle the Cohen-style paradoxes put forward against LP.
NPAS, it seems, is quite opposite to LP in spirit. Allen, the main proponent of the
view, explicitly says:
I have been asked to elaborate on the meaning of plausibility in this theoretical
structure. The difficulty in doing so is that the relative plausibility theory is a
positive rather than a normative theory. For reasons I will elaborate below,
plausibility can serve as a primitive theoretical term the meaning of which is
determined by its context in the explanation of trials. (Allen 2010, 10)
So, NPAS completely abandons the use of probabilistic tools in the explication it puts
forward. While the advantages of NPAS are clearly visible when it comes to aspects of
fact-finding that LP is allegedly blind to, this success comes at a price. There is something
theoretically unsatisfactory about the refusal to explicate the notion of relative plausibility
any further. And focusing on which narrative wins without explicating what in objective
realitymakes a narration successful carries the threat of subjectivism: it’s not about truth,
it’s about who tells a better story! (see Griffin 2012, for a discussion).
Come to think of it, the use of probabilistic tools in epistemology in general has been
quite successful and led to the development of a fruitful field of Bayesian epistemology.
Is there something highly specific to juridical fact-finding which makes probabilistic
tools useless? Perhaps. But in this paper I intend towork under a different hypothesis, at
least to see how far the probabilist can get without giving up on LP.
My working hypothesis is that the issues raised by the critics of LP apply not so
much to LP, as to its particular realizations such as CLP. The goal of the paper is to
argue that the probabilist can use probabilistic tools to understand the narrative
approach better and to incorporate insights of its proponents into a probabilistic
model of judiciary fact-finding. Thus, I will argue, ultimately there is no deep
opposition between the probabilistic and the narrative approach. It’s just that the
probabilistic models put forward so far have been too simplistic. The goal of the
paper is to develop a probabilistic model rich enough to capture the aspects of
judiciary fact-finding that the proponents of the narrative view find essential.
In Sect. 2 I start with describing the source of philosophical inspiration for the
framework, Di Bello’s New Legal Probabilism (NLP). In Sect. 3 I introduce the
formal framework. In Sect. 4 I explicate the conditions which all narrations have to
satisfy. In Sect. 5 I use the framework to explicate the evaluation criteria on various
narrations. Section 6 provides an example of thinking about a judiciary fact-finding
process from this perspective. Section 7 looks back at the informal narrative
8 ‘‘...the prosecutor is expected to offer a coherent and reasonably well-specified narrative of the crime.
Constructing a narrative, after all, is precisely a way of drawing inferences from a body of evidence and
weaving those inferences together’’ (Di Bello 2013, 24).
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approaches from the perspective of the formal framework. Section 8 compares the
framework to other existing formal approaches to judiciary fact-finding.
2 New legal probabilism (NLP)
Di Bello (2013) proposes that what’s missing in CLP on top of meeting a
probability threshold is a well-specified narrative which describes what happened in
a coherent way and is supported by the evidence available (the factual propositions
that need to be established follow from it and background knowledge):
In establishing a defendant’s guilt for a crime (murder, rape, theft, etc.), the
prosecutor should prove a number of factual propositions from which guilt
follows in accordance with the substantive law governing the case. To prove
the factual propositions of interest, the prosecutor typically advances a well-
specified narrative (a story, a theory) of the crime which describes what
happened in a coherent way. The narrative should be supported by the
evidence available, and the factual propositions that need to be established
should follow from the narrative as a matter of logic and commonsense. The
narrative should be well-specified in the sense that it should offer a sufficiently
specific and detailed reconstruction of what happened. (Di Bello 2013, 24)
Thus, while narrations play a crucial role in the account, their relation to evidence
and their factual support is also in the focus, hopefully susceptible to a more precise
probabilistic analysis.9
On this approach, a warranted conviction beyond reasonable doubt has to satisfy
a selection of conditions. First of all, the criminal justice system would be deeply
flawed if the prevailing party was simple the one who can tell the better story, with
no regard for evidential support. While in some cases one might have the impression
that it was the poetic skills of a party that helped them to prevail, it is a sign of
failure rather than an ideal to aspire to. Criminal trials, despite appearances, aren’t
merely competitions in creative story-telling. The relation of a narrative to the
evidence is to be understood quite widely, so that ‘‘the relationship between
evidence and narrative goes both ways: from the evidence to the narrative and from
the narrative to the evidence.’’ (Di Bello 2013, 208)
Hence the requirement, tying narrations to evidence:
(Evidential
support)
The probability of defendant’s guilt, given the evidence should be
sufficiently high, and a successful accusing narration should
explain the relevant evidence.
9 ‘‘But the probabilists can use narratives more directly. They can think of relevant evidence as evidence
that increases the probability of a narrative which the prosecution or the defense are proposing. Instead of
looking at whether an evidential item increases the probability of isolated propositions (which, in turn, are
material for guilt or innocence), the probabilists can directly consider the probability of an entire
narrative. The switch from isolated propositions to narratives is not in contradiction with a probability-
based account of relevant evidence. Both isolated propositions and entire narratives, after all, can be more
or less probable on the evidence.’’ (Di Bello 2013, 192)
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However, not only the presence of evidence, but also the absence of it can be
quite telling. For instance, in a drunk driving case one would strongly expect the
breathalyser test result and consider case incomplete without it. In some other case,
one would expect either DNA evidence, or an explanation as to why it isn’t
available. What evidence is missing depends on the content of a given narration, on
the evidence available, and on the background knowledge of fact-finders. If the
prosecution presents a certain narration, the fact-finders, relying on their
background knowledge, decide which traces the crime as described would most
likely leave, and which of them the criminal investigators would be likely to
discover. Lack of such evidence, if not sensibly explained by the narration, is itself
taken as a reason to doubt the narration.
(Evidential
completeness)
The evidence available at trial should be complete as far as a
reasonable fact-finders’ expectations are concerned.
Di Bello (2013, 209) talks also about type two gaps, which occur when a part of
narration is proposed which is not supported by any available evidence. I take this
type of gap to be subsumed under (Evidential support)—if part of the narration is
not supported by the available evidence, the whole narration is not sufficiently
supported by the available evidence.
Another condition, resiliency, is also taken by Di Bello (2013, 210) to be two-
fold. On one hand, the burden of the proof is on the prosecutor and the defense
should be given an opportunity to challenge the prosecutor’s case. On the other,
there shouldn’t be a non-negligible potential evidence which could undermine the
narration.
(Resiliency) The prosecutor’s narrative, based on the available evidence, should
not be susceptible to revision given reasonably possible future
arguments and evidence.
Finally, it is quite difficult to establish guilt without offering a narrative of it. A
crime involves the occurrence of the actus reus and the mens rea, and it’s hard to
establish both as isolated propositions. Ideally, the prosecution should answer
natural questions such as ‘who did it? why? how? when? where?’, and as
prosecution’s answers to these questions develop, new questions naturally arise,
given background knowledge and evidence.
(Narrativity) The narrative offered by the prosecutor should answer all the natural
or reasonable questions one may have about what happened, given
the content of the prosecutor’s narration and the available evidence.
What is the relation between NPAS and NLP? Strictly speaking, the criteria
described by Di Bello are too rich to suggest that NLP is an attempt at an explication
of NPAS. NLP seems more like an attempt to strike a balance between NPAS and
LP. On one hand, NLP and NPAS are both narration-based and emphasize the
crucial role stories (understood as theories of what happened) play in fact-finding.
NLP, just as NPAS, suggests that the decision to convict relies on factors that go
beyond mere guilt probability threshold. On the other hand, NLP attempts to be
more specific about the criteria that are to be used in choosing the right narration,
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and in the pursuit of this goal doesn’t hesitate to rely on resources that LP relied on:
objectivist approach, relation to evidence, and various notions that, hopefully, can
be formulated within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. Moreover, NLP
goes beyond both NPAS and CLP in elaborating on how various fairly complicated
factors interact in juridical decision-making.
Unfortunately, it is not quite clear whether the resources that NLP helps herself to
indeed fall into the realm of Bayesian methodology. So far, the key requirements
have not been explicated formally, and so it is not clear to what extent NLP
abandons the classical optimism about probabilistic methods in judiciary contexts.
The probabilists can enrich their framework by adding probability-based
accounts of evidential completeness, resiliency, and narrativity. To my
knowledge, no legal probabilist has undertaken the task in any systematic way.
(Di Bello 2013, 75)
This situation is rather unfortunate. The legal notion of a narrative, as one used to
decide human fate, is too important to be left to poetical musings of literary studies. A
deeper understanding of how such narratives relate to evidence and differ from fairy
tales. An account of how they can be used rationally in a decision process is needed. To
improve on the situation, the remainder of this paper is an attempt to develop a formal
approach inspired by NLP to the way legal narratives are rationally used in court.
3 Framework for narratives and probability
The next step towards explicating the relevant notion is to describe the formal
language and mathematical tools that will be used.
3.1 The language and its interpretation
No formal account of fact-finding related to guilt and of proceedings based on
narrations and evidence can be given unless the formal apparatus can actually
distinguish between pieces of evidence, parts of different narrative and the content
of the accusation. To even be able to reason explicitly about such things in a formal
framework we need to be able to express them in the formal language to start with.
Accordingly, the object language is a standard propositional language L (I
assume ^ and : are the primitive connectives, nothing serious hinges on the choice)
extended to a language Lþ with primitive unary operators E; NA1 ; . . .; NAk ,
ND1 ; . . .; N
D
l , and the guilt statement constant G.
The content of the guilt statement is given in terms of a list of conditions in the
background language that need to be established for a conviction to be justified.
This is modeled by conditioning on the definition of guilt G which has the form of
G  g1 ^    ^ gl
for appropriate g1; . . .; gl 2 L. Deciding on the content G depends on legal con-
siderations, and it is such considerations that set the goal for the fact-finding
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process. While there indeed is a difference between deciding on facts and deciding
on the legal qualification thereof, details of this aspect of the process lie beyond the
scope of this paper. In a sense, I set the legal issues aside, and simply think of G as
an abbreviation for the conjunction of the factual claims that the prosecution
endeavors to establish.
The intended interpretation of Ep is p is part of evidence. The idea is that after all
the evidence and all the arguments have been presented in court, the background
knowledge is to be enriched by the pieces of evidence presented, thought of as
sentences of L: E ¼ fe1; . . .; ejg  L. However, we are not only to extend our
beliefs by e1; . . .; ej, but also by the corresponding claims about these sentences
being parts of evidence: Ee1; . . .; Eej. The goal here is to make it possible to be able
to model dependencies between statements of the form Ep, so that one can sensibly
consider the probability that something should be a piece of evidence given that
something else is, or given the content of a narration. For instance, in a drunk
driving case, we might expect the breathalyser results to be part of evidence.
NAi p means p is part of an accusing narration N
A
i and N
D
i p means p is part of a
defending narration NDi . A few remarks are in order.
• First of all, accusing and defending narrations are kept apart, because the
requirements put on them are somewhat different. For instance, while the
accusation is supposed to make sense of (hopefully) all the evidence, the defense
has to explain away only those parts of evidence which seem to undermine the
defense’s line in light of the accusing narration(s).
• Secondly, it might seem unusual that I require for there to even be a defending
narration. Isn’t it up to the prosecution to come up with a narration as to who did
what and why, and isn’t it up to the defense to only rebut the prosecution’s
accusations? In a sense, yes—but the notion of narration at play in this formal
approach is very wide. The set of sentences put forward by the defense (or by
prosecution) is considered a narration, even though it might not resemble a full
causal story of who did what and why. It is enough that it is a set of sentences
about what happened (or, perhaps, emphatically, of what did not happen, taking
a stance on the guilt claim). It might help to think of the notion of narration here
as akin to that of a theory (= a set of sentences). From this perspective, causal
connections, relation to the evidence etc., while important, are involved when
one assesses the conditional probability of the narration given background
knowledge and the evidence, but aren’t built into a narration by mere definition.
• Third, one might be surprised to see the admissibility of multiple accusing and
multiple defense narrations. Isn’t the prosecution to offer a single line of offense,
and the defense to make up its mind on the way to rebut it? Perhaps, ultimately,
yes. But in the process of developing these, often multiple scenarios are
considered both by the prosecution and by the defense. The framework to be
developed should allow for comparison of not only the ultimately offered
narrations, but also potential versions of events. If one is attached to the one-
attack-one-defense model, it still falls within the scope of the framework.
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Each narration Ni (in contexts in which it is irrelevant whether a narration is an
accusing one or not, I will suppress the superscripts) is taken to be a finite set of
sentences ni1; ni2; . . .; niki of Lþ (the funny double subscript is there to indicate that
the numbers of sentences can differ between narrations). Notice also that the
language of narrations is richer than the language of evidence. This is because while
evidence is not supposed to be about narrations, narrations themselves can refer to
each other and use claims about other narrations, for instance when one, in a
narration, argues that another narration is incoherent.
Before we leave this section, let’s go over some abbreviations that will be used
further on.
• E stands ambiguously for the set of all sentences constituting evidence, for the
list of all such sentences, and for the conjunction thereof, so that it not only
makes sense to say p 2 E, but also to talk about the probability of a hypothesis h
given the whole evidence PðhjEÞ. Which reading is meant will always be clear
from the context (this convention for ambiguity applies to all finite sets of
sentences considered in this paper).
• Ed stands for (the set of) sentences obtained by preceding every piece of
evidence with the E operator: Ed ¼ fEuju 2 Eg. This is needed to be able to
express the difference between accepting the evidence itself (and conditioning
on it) and accepting the description thereof, which only states what the content
of E is.
• E is the set of sentences stating of whatever is not part of evidence, that it is not
part of evidence: E ¼ f:Euju 62 Eg. This is needed, because there is a
difference between knowing that certain sentences are pieces of evidence, and
knowing that no other sentence is.10;11
• For any narration Ni, symbols Ni, Ndi , and Ni are to be understood analogously to
E, Ed and E.
• Nd is the (positive) description of all the narrations,
S
i N
d
i , and N
=
S
i N

i adds
that this description is complete. To see that it does, notice that N for each
claim which is not part of evidence includes the information that it isn’t. In other
words, N explicitly ensures that no part of a narration goes on unmentioned in
Nd .
3.2 Standard Bayesianism
For the sake of the paper being fairly self-contained, this section introduces the
standard Bayesian epistemology and Bayesian conditionalization, before I explain
in the next section in what respect the current approach diverges from it, and how it
10 This will come relevant for a potential objection quite soon, when we turn to Bayesian conditioning.
For now, bear with me.
11 One might observe that E will normally come out infinite. This doesn’t put too heavy epistemic
burden on the cognitive agent. Just as I can easily know of each natural number that it is a natural number,
I can fairly easily know of each sentence that isn’t part of evidence that it isn’t part of evidence.
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uses conditionalization. A reader familiar with the basics of Bayesian epistemology
can safely skip this section.
Standard Bayesian epistemology (De Finetti 1937; Ramsey 1978; Bradley 2015)
represents degrees of beliefs (also known as credences) by real numbers.12 Degrees
of belief of an ideally rational agent, on the standard view, should satisfy the
standard axioms of probability: probability should take values between 0 and 1
inclusive, logically impossible events get probability 0, logically certain events have
probability 1, and the probability of the union of finitely many disjoint events is the
sum of their individual probabilities (in the context of this paper, whether this holds
also for infinite unions will not come up).13
If the agent’s credence in given evidence E is greater than 0, we can talk about
the conditional probability of a given hypothesis h given this evidence, PðhjEÞ,
which is defined by:
PðhjEÞ ¼ PðE ^ hÞ
PðEÞ :
Together with probabilism, the standard axioms of probability entail that an ideal
agent’s credences satisfy the (synchronic) Bayes’ Theorem, which tells us how the
conditional credence in the evidence given the hypothesis PtðEjhÞ at a certain time t
is related to the conditional credence in the hypotheses given the evidence at time t,
PtðhjEÞ.
PtðhjEÞ ¼ PtðEjhÞPtðhÞ
PtðEÞ ðBayesÞ
Bayes’ theorem, which is synchronic and only tells us something about the relation
between various credences in one and the same moment in time, should be dis-
tinguished from Bayes’ updating rule, which is a diachronic rule that tells us how
our credences should be revised in time as we learn new evidence. Assuming that
we begin with some prior credences at time t: PtðEjhÞ, PtðhÞ, PtðEÞ, Bayes’ theorem
alone will tell us that at that time our credence PtðhjEÞ should be PtðEjhÞPtðhÞPtðEÞ . What
Bayesian updating does on top of that, is it tells us that once at a later time u we
acquire full belief in evidence E, thus obtaining PuðEÞ ¼ 1, if nothing else changes,
we should update our unconditional PuðhÞ to what we previously thought the con-
ditional credence in h given E was, that is to PtðhjEÞ.14
12 If you’re worried about using exact real numbers for such vague things as degrees of belief, the worry
can be mitigated by various representation theorems, according to which even if we have no exact
numerical values for degrees of beliefs, and our ordering of degrees of belief satisfies only certain fairly
natural formal constraints, the whole thing behaves as if there were real numbers associated with degrees
of beliefs, and so we can go ahead and play around with real numbers.
13 Discussing all the reasons for and against Bayesian epistemology lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Good places to start are Bradley (2015) and Earman (1992). In this paper I assume that Bayesian
epistemology is more or less correct, and develop a way a Bayesian epistemologist can think about
narratives in juridical contexts.
14 Bayesian updating doesn’t follow from probabilistic axioms alone, but with some bells and whistles
the arguments for probabilism work also for Bayesian updating. Also, the Bayesian toolbox contains a
method of updating upon uncertain evidence, Jeffrey conditionalization. Since this move doesn’t bring
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3.3 Partial probability distributions
There is one important aspect in which the current framework diverges from the
standard Bayesian. The fact-finders, on one hand, are supposed to rely on their
background knowledge when assessing the plausibility of a given narration, but on
the other hand, they clearly cannot rely on all biases and assumptions that they
have.15 The question of which part of background knowledge can be used and which
beliefs should be suspended is rather delicate, but answering it lies beyond the scope
of this paper (and, indeed, lies beyond the scope of logic or formal methods in
general).
Quite clearly, suspending our conviction about p cannot be easily modeled in the
standard Bayesian framework, since even the most sensible candidate, 1 / 2, doesn’t
do the job. Just to give a simple example, there is a difference between knowing that
a given coin is fair, and assigning probability of 1 / 2 to heads, and not knowing
how fair a coin is at all.
I submit, a more sensible way to model the admissible partial background
knowledge is by means of a partial conditional credence function P, which
(partially) maps Lþ  PðLþÞ to [0, 1].16 This means that P takes a pair composed
of a formula (though of as a conclusion), and a set of formulas (though of as
conditions, or premises), and assigns a degree of credence, pretty much just as a
standard conditional probability distribution does. This description of the arguments
might seem cumbersome, but this is just a simple mathematical way of capturing the
idea that a partial probability distribution is a conditional probability distribution
(and this justifies writing PðhjEÞ instead of Pðhh; EiÞ).17
So one difference between this approach and the standard Bayesian one is that
probability is partial—it doesn’t have to be defined for all possible sentences. The
second difference is that classically, conditional probability is defined in terms of
unconditional probability (for cases where the condition doesn’t have probability 0),
whereas here conditional probability is taken as a primitive (thus allowing for there
to be conditional probabilities even if the condition has probability 0). Uncondi-
tional probability is defined as the conditional probability given a purely logical
truth (> is any logical truth, ? is any logical falsehood):
Footnote 14 continued
anything unexpected, I decided to ignore this complication and focus on presenting the already somewhat
complicated framework in as simple set-up as possible.
15 ‘‘...jurors will draw upon their own backgrounds to construct and evaluate explanations for the
evidence. When stories conflict and jurors must privilege one to reach a verdict, they do not rely only on
‘‘case-specific information acquired during the trial,’’ but also on their experience and values and on
‘‘generic expectations about what makes a complete story.’’ Triers of fact look for a story that both ‘‘has
all of its parts’’ and corresponds to their ‘‘knowledge about what typically happens in the world.’’ (Griffin
2012, 294)
16 Partial credence functions for conditional probabilities have been introduced by Lepage and Morgan
(2003), Lepage (2012); my definition differs from that account in a few inessential aspects.
17 For a more general approach defending the use of partial conditional probability functions in
epistemology see Fraassen (1995).
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PðuÞ ¼ Pðuj>Þ
This feature, I submit, makes the model better fit to modeling situations in which a
fact-finder prior to the process suspends their belief in guilt or the evidence, but still
can have sensible conditional credences about how the evidence is related to guilt.
What makes it still a probability distribution? The satisfaction of the following
requirements. # and " stand for being defined and being undefined respectively. A
partial probability distribution has to have an extension to a total conditional
probability distribution over Lþ satisfying the standard axioms of conditional
probability, Moreover, it additionally has to satisfy the following conditions for any
C  Lþ, and any u;w 2 Lþ (first I present the formulas, informal glosses follow):
Pð>jCÞ ¼ 1Pð?jCÞ ¼ 0 ðPart-1Þ
u 2 C) PðujCÞ # ðPart-2Þ
PðujCÞ #, Pð:ujCÞ # Pðu ^ wjCÞ #, Pðw ^ ujCÞ # ðPart-3Þ
Pðu ^ wjCÞ[ 0 ) PðujCÞ #; Pðw; jCÞ # PðujCÞ ¼ 0 ) Pðu ^ wjCÞ # ðPart-4Þ
PðujCÞ ") Pðu ^ wjCÞ " unless PðwjCÞ ¼ 0 ðPart-5Þ
(Part-1) requires that logical truths have probability 1 and logical contradictions
always have probability 0. (Part-2) requires that the probability of a claim given a
set of premises that includes it is always defined. (Part-3) states that the conditional
probability of a claim is defined just in case the conditional probability of its
negation is, and that the order of conjuncts has no impact on whether the conditional
probability of a conjunction is defined. According to (Part-4), the conditional non-
zero probability of a conjunction is defined only if the conditional probability of
both conjuncts is. Moreover, if the conditional probability of a conjunct is 0, the
conditional probability of the conjunction is defined (and by the fact that the cre-
dence has an extension to a total conditional probability satisfying the standard
axioms, we also know that it will be 0 as well). (Part-5) says that, unless this unusual
circumstance occurs, the conditional probability of a conjunction is undefined if the
conditional probability of at least one conjunct is. Since the fact-finders are sup-
posed not to be biased and aren’t informed about the trial yet, we additionally
assume that the priors of guilt, of what the evidence and what the narrations are, are
undefined: PðGÞ ", Pðg1 ^    ^ glÞ ", PðEuÞ "; PðNiuÞ " for any u 2 Lþ, and any
1\i\k.18
Of course, in practice, it’s not that any prior partial credence would do. It has to
be a credence developed in touch with reality—that’s why various procedures (such
as the requirement of multiple jury members agreeing on the correctness of a certain
inference) ensuring that no one uses arbitrary assumptions in the process of fact-
18 Remember, in this context whenever we talk about unconditional credences, we take them to be
conditional on >, a logically necessary sentence. This way we stick to the idea that conditional
probability is primitive.
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finding are in place. Formal explication of what the objectivity requirement boils
down to is notoriously difficult and lies beyond the scope of purely formal methods.
In what follows I simply assume that the partial credence used expresses sensible
and admissible background assumptions about the world.
3.4 Information and updates
After all the evidence and all the arguments have been presented in court, the
background knowledge obtained now consists of the pieces of evidence presented,
E, information about what is not part of evidence, the content of the guilt statement
G, and the positive and negative description of the content of a certain finite
assembly of finite theories meant to defend or accuse the defendant, also known as
‘‘narratives’’, ND1 ; . . .; N
D
k ; N
A
1 ; N
A
m.
When making various assessments in the fact-finding process, at various stages
one needs to conditionalize on various parts of the available information, depending
on what is being assessed. Before giving more details on this, I first need to briefly
introduce the main choices of conditions at play. The following are introduced for
any u 2 Lþ and any C  Lþ:
Name notation meaning
Full Pf ðujCÞ PðujE; Ed ; E; Nd ; N; G;CÞ
n-full Pnf ðujCÞ PðujE; Ed ; Nd ; N; G;CÞ
Informed PiðujCÞ PðujE; Ed ; Nd ; G;CÞ
Evidential PeðujCÞ PðujE; Ed ; E; G;CÞ
Argued PaðujCÞ PðujNd ; G;CÞ
Play-along PNj ðujCÞ PðujNj; Nd ; N; G;CÞ
n-extended play-along PnNj ðujCÞ PðujNj; E; Ed ; Nd ; N; G;CÞ
e-extended play-along PeNj ðujCÞ PðujNj; E; Ed ; E; Nd ; G;CÞ
f-extended play-along PfNj ðujCÞ PðujNj; E; Ed ; E; Nd ; N; G;CÞ
The names are somewhat arbitrary but the idea is quite simple. The full credence
function results from the update on all the information available: on the evidence,
description of the evidence, description of what is not part of evidence, description
of all narrations and what is not part of them, and the definition of the guilt
statement. The n-full credence results from the full credence by eliminating E from
the background information. Informed credence function drops the negative
description of what is not part of evidence and what is not part of narration.
Argued credence updates only on the definition of guilt, and the whole family of
play-along credences work as if a particular narration was true, given that we know
what arguments all sides have (or have not) given (and thus conditioning on Nd and
N as well). Finally, sometimes we’ll need to update on the content of a narration
together with full information that we have (f-extended play-along), or with almost
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full information, but either without assuming that we know exactly what has not
been presented as evidence (n-extended play-along), or without assuming that we
know what narrations haven’t said (e-extended play-along). The reasons why we
need so many types of updates will become clear quite soon.
3.5 Thresholds
There seem to be at least four types of stances that a fact-finder might take towards a
claim. First, a fact-finder might consider a claim completely uncontroversial, and
accept it without any further argument. This holds for various obvious claims that
all sides in court agree about, such as ‘‘the accused is a human being’’. Such stance
will be modeled by the credence in a given claim reaching the uncontroversial
acceptability threshold, a.
On the opposite side of the spectrum we have claims that all fact-finders
uncontroversially reject, such as ‘‘the crime has been committed by an alien
pretending to be the accused’’. Sentences which are not uncontroversially rejected in
this sense will be said to reach the non-negligibility threshold, n. The relation
between a and n seems straightforward. A claim is non-negligible just in case its
negation isn’t uncontroversially acceptable:
(Negligible) PðujCÞ n, Pð:ujCÞla
This condition is achieved by taking n to be as far from 0 as a is from one. So given
a, n can be introduced by n ¼df 1 a.
Notice that a and n shouldn’t be equal to 1 and 0 respectively (let’s focus on
a ¼ 1, the reasoning for n ¼ 0 is analogous). 1 is reserved for complete certainty, so
that if a claim has credence 1, no new information can lead to the change of this
credence. This is definitely not a necessary feature of uncontroversially accepted
claims. They’re often uncontroversially accepted without them being accepted with
absolute certainty akin to that of truths of mathematics. Analogously, some
uncontroversially rejected claims can become more sensible in light of new
evidence or new arguments.
One more type of stance needs to be incorporated into the framework—that of
strong plausibility. Usually there are claims that are strongly supported while not
being as close to certainty as the uncontroversially acceptable ones. For instance,
further evidence of a false positive lacking, it is strongly plausible that a person with
positive breathalyzer test was intoxicated at the time of the test. Think of deciding
whether a claim reaches the threshold of strong plausibility (given some evidence)
as answering the question: would you to accept the claim, given the evidence? This
kind of credence that we would normally find sufficient for acting upon in our
uncertain world will be denoted by s.
In analogy to the previous case, we can also talk of (strong) rejectability, r,
defined by 1 s, so that:
(Strong) PðujCÞ r, Pð:ujCÞls
to the effect that we would be willing to reject (although the rejection might be not
as uncontroversial as with claims with credences below n) any claim with credence
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below r. In what follows, since no notion of weak rejectability is used, the adjective
‘‘strong’’ will be dropped. Clearly a[ s[ r[ n.
Before we move on, two more remarks. Where the thresholds exactly lie is a
context-dependent issue, and there is no independent way of specifying their values
prior to the consideration of the issues at hand. Having said this, however, we do in
practice decide that some things are uncontroversially accepted or rejected, or that
they’re very plausible—and the thresholds are just formal counterparts of these
distinctions that we in fact often draw in real life.
Another remark is that as far as the framework of partial probability is involved, it is
in principle possible that when we move from a defined credence PðujCÞ to another
credence by extending the set of conditions to a larger set, PðujC;RÞ, the result might
be undefined. As far as the purely formal constraints on credences are involved, this
is a possibility. In the applications, however, this phenomenon is rather undesirable:
ideally we would like the conditional credences of various claims given the evidence
presented in court to be defined. It would, however, be wrong to enforce this by some
a priori conditions put on the framework. That fact-finders using their background
knowledge can work out how likely various claims are, is a material and context-
dependent issue that shouldn’t be decided by fiat, and can be only hoped for.
4 ‘‘Formal’’ conditions on narrations to be considered
Think of N as the set of attacking and defending narrations that are being seriously
considered in the fact-finding process. A narration Nk has to satisfy various
conditions to belong to the group. Let’s start with conditions that should be satisfied
by both attacking and defending narrations.
4.1 Exclusion
The requirement is that narrations under consideration should pairwise exclude each
other given all that we know about the case (hence the use of full conditional
conditionalization Pf ). If in light of anything that is known the accusing narration
doesn’t exclude a defense one there is something wrong with the positions. If, on the
other hand, two accusing (or two defending) narrations didn’t exclude each other in
light of what is known, there wouldn’t be a good reason to treat them as different
narrations and one should perhaps be part of another. Moreover, whether they
exclude each other should be uncontroversial, and hence the use of a as a threshold.
(Exclusion) Pf ð:ðNi ^ NjÞÞ a; for i 6¼ j
4.2 Decision
A defense narration should clearly state that, given all that is known, the accused is
not guilty, and an accusing narration should clearly state that, given all that is
known, they are:
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(Decision) PfN
A
i ðGÞ a ^ PfNDk ð:GÞ a
4.3 Initial plausibility
First of all, we shouldn’t consider narrations that are uncontroversially excluded by
sensible background knowledge or by evidence. Not seriously considering scenarios
in which the crime is committed by a third party who can become invisible is an
example of the former, and not seriously considering scenarios in which the victim
died of led poisoning exactly one second before being shot when the autopsy
showed no trace of led poisoning and there is no reason to suspect it is an example
of the latter. This condition is formally expressed by:
(Initial plausibility) PeðNkÞ n
A few words on the choice of the right type of update. Using a play-along credence
instead of Pe is a clear no-go. We shouldn’t evaluate narrations merely in light of
narrations. One might be inclined to simply use the prior credence P instead of Pe. I
find it more efficient to filter out narrations with prior credence  n but uncon-
troversially excluded by evidence already at this stage (this also applies to choosing
Pe over Pa). Using P instead of Pe won’t change anything in the ultimate choice of
the deciding narration, anyway. One might also feel inclined to use the full credence
Pf instead of Pe. I find it more useful to initially assess narrations without paying
attention to which side said what, and looking only at the evidence. Ultimately, who
said what will be factored in in further assessment of competing narrations, anyway.
4.4 Exhaustion
The next that it should be strongly plausible that at least one of the narrations hold,
given all that we know about the case:
(Exhaustion) Pf ðN1 _    _ NkÞ s
where N1; . . .; Nk is the complete list of all (defensive and accusing) narrations under
consideration.
The reason why the relevant credence is the full one is that in considering
whether there are any other possible scenarios that we might’ve ignored it’s best to
rely on all that we know (as contrasted with looking at the evidence only when we
evaluate the initial plausibility of a narration).
The reason why the threshold used is s rather than a is that sometimes the search
for further alternative narrations ceases even if the fact-finders don’t have absolutely
uncontroversial certainty that all options have been considered, but rather because
no one came up with a new one, despite the best efforts of both sides. In such a case
a decision will have to be made despite the annoying lack of uncontroversial
conviction about the matter.
We need to be careful to avoid reading into the condition more than it requires,
though. Prima facie, one might argue against the requirement as follows:
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The set of narratives does not have to be jointly exhaustive. For instance, if
there are three possible suspects, x, y and z, for defending x it suffices to argue
that y is as likely as x to have done it. Nobody needs to mention z and his
possible authorship.19
The worry stems from thinking of narrations only as accusing stories of who did
what. Indeed, if the three options were that one of the three subjects is guilty
(abbreviated as Gx _ Gy _ Gz) then it is possible that the only accusing narration is
Gx, and the defense doesn’t have to say anything about z as long as they manage to
undermine this narration.
But (Exhaustion) doesn’t require that the set of accusing narrations be
exhaustive. We need to keep in mind that the understanding of narrations in this
framework is quite wide and that any set of claims made by the defense to
undermine an accusing narration counts as a narration itself. Thus, the requirement
is weaker than it may seem. For if the accusing narration is NA ¼ Gx, the defense
narration might simply be (or include) its negation ND ¼ :Gx—this would be
sufficient for the satisfaction of (Exhaustion), since clearly Pf ðGx _ :GxÞ s, and
no mention of z has to be made.
On the other hand, one could indeed try to impose a stronger requirement:
(Strong exhaustion) Pf ðNA1 _    _ NAkÞ s
where NA1 ; . . .; N
A
k is the complete list of all accusing narrations under consideration.
Now the question is: is the objection lethal to the sensibility of requiring (Strong
exhaustion)? It seems not. For if indeed, there are at least three initially plausible
candidates for the perpetrator, the prosecution should in fact seriously consider at
least three different narrations, each indicating a different perpetrator. Of course, the
defense of x is not obliged to prove which of the accusing narrations not blaming x
is true. The defense can fail to do so while succeeding at defending x without
violating (Strong exhaustion), since it might be the case that Pf ðGx _ Gy _ GzÞ s
despite Pf ðGxÞ\s and despite Pf ðGyj:GxÞ and Pf ðGzj:GxÞ both being below s as
well.
There is, however, a better reason not to require (Strong exhaustion). The
framework is built to also model cases where the prosecution’s case isn’t very
strong. Where the accusations aren’t even strong enough to ensure that it is strongly
plausible that at least one of the accusing narrations holds. For this reason, I will
stick with (Exhaustion) instead.
5 Evaluating narrations
In Sect. 3 I introduced the formal framework for capturing more precisely the
intuitions underlying NPL. In Sect. 4 we discussed conditions that the set of
narrations to be subjected to serious consideration has to satisfy. Now it’s time to
19 I thank an anonymous referee of LORI VI conference for raising this objection and motivating me to
clarify the issue.
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move on to more elaborate conditions involved in the assessment and relative
assessment of narrations, a process that hopefully leads to a justified decision.
5.1 Explaining evidence
This one is a bit more tricky, for here the distinction between the accusing and the
defending narrations becomes crucial. Let’s start with accusing narrations. After all
the narrations have been presented and deployed, an accusing narration NAi should
‘‘make sense’’ of evidence in the following sense. For any item of evidence
presented, e, if, according to NAi , it is not excluded as evidence, it should be strongly
plausible given NAi .
For any e 2 E; ½:PNAi ð:EeÞ s) PNAi ðeÞ s	 ðNegligibleÞ
Notice that the relevant credence function is the play-along one. We’re wondering
what to think of a piece of evidence assuming the narration is true, and so NAi has to
be among the conditions. Notice also that including the description of the evidence
in the condition would be pointless. Once we know what the evidence is (and what it
isn’t), evaluating how likely it is that something is a piece of evidence is trivial:
either we know it is, and the credence is 1, or we know it isn’t, and the credence is 0.
We avoid this difficulty by suspending our convictions about what the evidence is
when we evaluate what the evidence according to the narration should be. More-
over, it would also be pointless to include evidence itself among the conditions.
Trivially, any evidence explains itself, in the sense that the conditional credence in
any e 2 E given any set of conditions containing e is 1.
The sense in which a defending narration is supposed to explain evidence is
somewhat different. After all, if the defense story is rather minimal and mostly
constitutes in rebutting the accusations, it isn’t reasonable to expect the defense to
explain all pieces of evidence, as long as they aren’t really used to support the
opposing accusing narration. It is also not reasonable to expect the defense to
provide a story explaining how each piece of evidence came into existence. For
instance, suppose that blood of type matching the defendant’s blood type was found
on a piece of clothing. It is not up to the defense to explain how it got there. For if it
isn’t the defendant’s blood, the defense most likely has no way of knowing how it
did. Rather, the defense should argue that the possibility of the evidence being as it
is while the defense’s narration is true hasn’t been rejected. Thus, we put the
condition on a defending narration NDk as follows:
(Explaining evidence D) For any e 2 E; if there is NAi
such that PðNAi jeÞ[ PðNAi Þ;
then PN
D
k ðeÞ r:
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5.2 Missing evidence
Let’s start with saying when a narration Ni misses some evidence (MEðNiÞ). The
intuition here is that sometimes, given the narration and whatever evidence we
already have, certain evidence should be available, but it isn’t. For instance, in a
drunk driving case the fact-finders would naturally expect a breathalyzer result, and
in a murder case evidence as to how the victim was killed is needed. A defending
narration can also have this flaw. For instance, it might claim that the defendant was
absent from the scene of the crime at the time of the crime, without evidence to that
effect.
(Missing evidence) MEðNiÞ , for some u1; . . .;uu 62 E :
½PnNiðEu1 _    _ EuuÞ s	
The disjunction above is there to ensure generality. It might be the case that some
evidence from among a group of possible pieces of evidence would be needed,
without any particular piece of evidence being expected. This format applies also to
the case in which u1; . . .;uu is simply u;:u—in such a case, the evidence is simply
expected to decide a claim one way or the other, without any particular way being
expected.
Notice also that E isn’t included in the conditions (although we preserve
information about which narration said, or didn’t say, what). Otherwise, for every
u 62 E, Eu would already be decided with credence 0. What we are assessing, is
rather what should be included in evidence given the narration and what we already
know is among evidence; and this is a completely sensible question.
We might consider the opposite problem: situations in which some evidence is
available, but assuming a given narration, there shouldn’t be such evidence. This
flaw, however, doesn’t deserve a separate requirement. After all, the presence of
such a piece of evidence lowers the evidential support that the narration has, and so
the requirement will be incorporated in the condition of evidential support which
will be introduced soon.
5.3 Gaps
Sometimes a narration should be more specific, given what it says and what we
already know. For instance, an accusing narration might be required to specify how
the victim was attacked, or a defending narration should specify where the
defendant was at the time of the crime.
Accordingly, we say that Ni is gappy (GðNiÞ) just in case there are claims that the
narration should choose from and yet it doesn’t:
(Gap) GðNiÞ , for some u1; . . .;uu 62 Ni
PfNiðu1 _    _ uuÞ s^
PeNiðNiu1 _    _ NiuuÞ s
Ni is gappy just in case if there are claims u1; . . .;uu not in Ni such that:
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(i) Given all that we know and the narration, it’s strongly plausible that one of
them holds. For instance, given all that we know, the victim was murdered
using some tool, and the defendant had to be somewhere, if not at the crime
scene.
(ii) Moreover, assuming the narration and what we already know (minus N,
information about what narrations didn’t say), it is strongly plausible that
one of the options considered should be part of the narration.20 For instance,
the accusing narration might be required to specify what tool was used, and
the defending narration might be expected to specify where the defendant
was if not at the crime scene.
5.4 Dominating accusing narration
An accusing narration NAi dominates the set of all accusing narrationsN
A just in case
it doesn’t miss any evidence, it doesn’t contain any gap, and in light of all available
information and evidence it is at least as likely any other accusing narration, and is
strongly plausible:
DðNAi Þ ,:MEðNAi Þ ^ :GðNAi Þ^
Pf ðNAi Þ Pf ðNAj Þ for all j 6¼ i^
Pf ðNAi Þ s
ðStrongÞ
Let’s see how the right-hand side expresses the required condition. The first two
conjuncts use terms introduced beforehand and simply say that NAi doesn’t miss any
evidence and contains no gaps. The third conjunct says that given all that is known
NAi is more likely than any other narration N
A
j . The last conjunct requires that given
all that is known, the probability of NAi is at least s.
5.5 Resiliency
Recall that the resiliency requirement was that a narrative should not be easily
susceptible to revision given reasonably possible future arguments and evidence.
The first part: being subjected to possible reasonable arguments is handled by the
framework in admitting a whole array of possible narrations. Narrations, let me
emphasize again, are understood here quite widely, and so aren’t simply causal
stories of what happened, but rather sets of sentences that can be put forward by a
side in the case. A narration in this sense might also contain comments, arguments
and criticism of other narrations. This was partially the point of introducing object-
language operators corresponding to narrations. Thus, given that a properly wide
array of narrations has been considered (and answering the question whether it has
surpasses the reach of what can sensibly expected of purely formal methods), the
first part of the resiliency requirement is satisfied.
20 The reason why we can’t rely on N in the assessment here is the usual. If we did, for any claim not in
Ni the credence would be 0.
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The second part, however, can be further explicated. A dominating narration NAi
is resilient (RðNAi Þ) just in case there is no non-negligible potential evidence that
might undermine it, at least in light of all we know (minus the negative description
of the evidence, to avoid triviality)—that is, no u with Pnf ðEuÞ n–such that if E
was modified to E [ fug, NAi would no longer dominate.
Here is an interesting objection to the requirement of resiliency:21
Here is a counterexample. Imagine that you have a proof in the form of a video
recording—a plaintiff committing a crime. However, the plaintiff refuses to
talk about it and no witnesses are to be found, the motive is unknown
whatsoever. Do we have enough basis for conviction? Yes. Moreover, imagine
the same case being revisited some time after the conviction. New evidence,
previously unobtainable, comes into play. Someone makes a confession saying
that he threatened the plaintiff saying that he will harm him and his family
unless the plaintiff commits a crime caught on the video tape. It becomes
obvious that the plaintiff would never have done what he did if it was not for
the threat. Resiliency is down, as we did have enough evidence to convict and
we do have enough evidence later to scrape the conviction.
Now, is this a counterexample to the requirement? I’m not inclined to say yes. If
indeed best efforts have been made to discover the reason why the plaintiff refuses
to explain, the best that can be done, perhaps, is a conviction. But resiliency is
satisfied: all potentially available evidence that we might reasonably expected,
given that the plaintiff won’t budge and there is no other evidence available that we
can try to obtain has been obtained. If, on the other hand, no best efforts to that
purpose have been made, the accusing narration isn’t resilient. But let’s play along,
suppose that it is, as in the former scenario. What happens if after some time it turns
out that more evidence does become available, leading to acquittal? Well, if it
couldn’t be reasonably expected before, the prior decision was resilient, but, sadly,
mistaken. If it could, the prior decision wasn’t resilient and the conviction wasn’t
justified. The bottom line is that justified convictions based on resilient narrations
also can be mistaken, and the example is underspecified. It either is one of a
mistaken resilient conviction, or one of a non-resilient conviction, depending on
whether best efforts to investigate further has been made.
5.6 Conviction beyond reasonable doubt
A defense narration NDk raises reasonable doubt (RDðNDk Þ) if it has no gaps, and
hasn’t been rejected given all that we know:
(Reasonable doubt) RDðNDk Þ ,:GððNDk ÞÞ ^ Pf ðNDk Þ r
The intuition here is that not only it is the task of the prosecution to argue for the
accusing narration, but also to argue against any sensible narration that the defense
could conjure. As long as there is one that hasn’t been rejected, conviction beyond
21 It’s due to Aleksandra Samonek.
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reasonable doubt is unjustified. Ideally, a defense narration raising reasonable doubt
would also not miss any evidence, but this shouldn’t be a necessary condition.
Whether certain evidence has been collected or is available depends on multiple
factors beyond the control of the defense, some of which have nothing to do with the
plausibility of the defending narration.
Accordingly, we say that a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt if it is justified
by a resilient dominating narration and no defense narration raises reasonable doubt.
6 An example
Let’s use the framework to model the development of two narrations in a fairly
simple case of an alleged burglary, discussed in Bex et al. (2007). Since providing
full formalization would be lengthy and tiring and wouldn’t contribute to clarity, I’ll
only comment informally how various aspects of the case should be captured within
the framework. The accusing narration is as follows:
On the 18th of November, Andrew King climbs over the fence of the backyard
of the Zomerdijk family with the intention to look if there is something
interesting for him in the family’s house. Through this yard he walks to the
door that offers entry into the bedroom of the 5-year-old son of the family. The
door is not closed, so King opens it and enters the bedroom to see if there is
anything of interest in the house. Because it is dark, King does not see the toy
lying on the floor. King hits the toy, causing it to make a sound which causes
the dog to give tongue. King hears the dog and runs outside, closing the door
behind him. Mr. Zomerdijk hears the toy and the dog. He goes to the bedroom
and sees King running away, through the closed garden door. He shouts there
is a burglar, come and help me! and runs into the garden after King. King, who
wants to pretend he is lost, does not run away. In spite of this, Zomerdijk
jumps on King and, aided by his brother, who is visiting the Zomerdijk family,
molests King.
Let’s first identify the items that would count as evidence (the elements of EÞ—I’ll
use simple abbreviations instead of meaningless variables:22
fence King climbed the fence and was in the backyard.
toy Toy made a sound.
dog Dog started barking at that time.
w bang Witnesses 1, 2 and 3 testify there was no loud bang.
Now, the essential parts of the prosecution’s narration, NA are:
22 Strictly speaking, toy and dog are due to witness’ testimonies, and so if I wanted the description to be
complete, I should rather say things such as ‘‘witnesses 1, 2, and 3 testified that the toy made a sound’’,
but for uncontested claims of witnesses for the sake of simplicity I include claims themselves as evidence.
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intentions King had bad intentions.
enter King climbed the fence and entered the house.
noise King King caused toy and dog.
closed There was no bang because King closed the door.
G King attempted to commit burglary and entered the house with that
intention.
The essential parts of the defense story (ND) are:
lost King was simply lost and didn’t enter the house.
noise wind dog and toy were caused by wind, which opened and shut the door.
Let’s see which conditions are satisfied by the narrations, given sensible background
knowledge. First, (Exclusion). Indeed, the narrations exclude each other, since
Pf ðintentionsjlostÞ\r, and definitely Pf ðenterjlostÞ ¼ 0. Equally clearly,
both narrations make a claim about the suspect’s guilt and so (Decision) is satisfied.
The accusing narration is clearly a non-negligible scenario given the evidence,
and the defending narration might sound suspicious, but not negligible and should
be given some consideration. So (Initial plausibility) is also satisfied.
Now, are there other possible scenarios of what have happened? In principle, yes.
King could’ve been thrown over the fence by a group of drunk strangers (or simply
dropped in the backyard by aliens), but given that the defense didn’t propose these
ways out, there is no reason to consider these options. Also, he might have entered
the house with the intention to murder the inhabitants, but given that he had no
weapon and no motive to do that, this accusing narration would be easily dominated
by the actual one. Overall, there are strong reasons to think that either the
prosecution’s or the defendant’s story is true, and so (Exhaustion) is satisfied. If
there was a good reason to think another scenario is viable, it should’ve been put
forward by one of the sides.
It is quite clear that the facts described would have happened if the accusing
narration was true, so:
Pðfence; toy; dog; w bangjintentions; enter; noise King; closedÞ ¼
¼ PNAðfence; toy; dog; w bangÞ s
which means that the accusing narration satisfies (Explaining evidence A). It is also
quite clear that the defending narration fails to explain evidence in the sense of
(Explaining evidence A), mainly because Pðw bangjnoise windÞ ¼ PNDðw bangÞ is
rather low. It doesn’t seem, however, to be low enough to be below r. After all, with
a toy playing music in the background, dog barking, and startled inhabitants rushing
toward the backyard, there is a decent chance that no one was paying attention to the
sound of the door, or that the bang wasn’t as loud as the prosecution would suggest.
For this reason, failing to satisfy (Explaining evidence A), which is not required
of a defending narration anyway, isn’t lethal to ND. Moreover, ND satisfies
366 R. Urbaniak
123
(Explaining evidence D), because that condition requires only that those pieces of
evidence that are used to support the accusing narration aren’t false according to the
accusing narration (that is, ‘‘aren’t below r’’). And indeed, all the pieces of evidence
could be true given the narration, so at least at this stage of evaluation we can still
see ND as a potential source of reasonable doubt.
Now we come to the issue of missing evidence. Clearly, ND misses some
evidence. Given that it says the wind shut the door, a loud bang is expected, and a
loud bang is expected to have been heard by the witnesses, but it hasn’t been heard.
While not missing evidence is not necessary for a defense narration to raise
reasonable doubt, this will definitely come into play when assessing overall
probability of the narration given all information available.
Whether NA misses evidence is more subtle and depends on the details of the
circumstances. Perhaps, King didn’t wear gloves and the police should check for
further evidence of him entering the building, such as fingerprints on the door;
perhaps it was raining and the police should have checked footprints in the bedroom
near the entrance. But for the sake of example let us assume there is no
circumstance resulting in the accusing narration missing evidence and proceed with
our evaluation.
The accusing narration doesn’t seem gappy. The defense narration, as it stands,
is. If indeed King was lost, he should be able to explain why in the evening he was
in an unfamiliar neighborhood, why he thought that jumping a fence to somebody’s
backyard was a good approach to solving the problem, and why he first started
running. In the absence of such explanations, the narration indeed is gappy, and so
the only source of reasonable doubt fails. But to continue our example, let’s assume
that King did provide some explanation of that sort, explanations, which weren’t
however too convincing.
Given all that we already said and lack of competition, the last thing we need to
do in order to decide whether the accusing narration is a dominating one, is to
evaluate whether Pf ðNAÞ[ s. And indeed this seems to hold. It also seems that the
accusing narration is resilient: no potential evidence that acquitting King is in sight.
Thus, ultimately, assuming King tried to fill the gaps, and the accusing narration
doesn’t miss any evidence, the conviction now depends on whether we’re convinced
that Pf ðNDÞ\r, that is, whether King’s story is bad enough to be rejected. This will
certainly depend on how he tried to fill the gaps and on what evidence he will put
forward to support explanations. Let’s leave him to this challenging task.
7 Looking back at NLP and NPAS
To what extent does the framework presented capture the intuitions underlying
NPAS and NLP? As far as NPAS is concerned, the key claim was that for the
conviction to be justified there has to be a plausible accusing narration and all
sources of reasonable doubt have to be excluded. This is captured by requiring the
existence of a dominating accusing narration and lack of a defense narration raising
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reasonable doubt. How do the formalized requirements square with those put
forward by NLP, though?
(Evidential support) is modeled on one hand by requiring that the accusing
narration should explain the evidence, and on the other hand by requiring that the
credence in the narration, given all background information including evidence, be
at least strong.
(Evidential completeness), which requires that the evidence presented in court
should be as complete, as it can reasonably expected to be, is incorporated by
requiring that the accusing narration shouldn’t miss any evidence.
(Resiliency), as already discussed in Sect. 5.5, is built in by means of two
devices. Being subjected to possible reasonable arguments is handled by requiring
that a whole array of possible narrations should be considered and as much freedom
in formulating candidate narrations be allowed. Resistance to revision under
potential future evidence is pretty much explicitly required in the framework.23
Finally, (Narrativity) is represented by the requirement that the accusing
narration have no gaps—that there are no claims that the narration should choose
from but doesn’t.
Having said this, at least one aspect of the explication might be considered
disturbing. Often, the statements within a narration are arranged with some
structure, causal or otherwise, while I simply represent narrations as sets of
sentences. One might complain that this view of narrations is a serious
impoverishment.
I don’t deny that narrations indeed do come with some structure, and it is mostly
in virtue of the causal story that they tell that they explain the evidence and are
supported by it. However, restricting the connections between claims in a narration
23 One comment is in order. Di Bello (2013, 77) inspired by Skyrms (1977) proposed the following
explication (I’ll refer to it as DB):
The LEGAL RESILIENCY of a conditional probability statement PðGjEÞ ¼ r, relative to a set of
propositions R, is given by 1 minus its downward variability, i.e. 1 maxfjr  PðAjE ^ piÞjg
restricted to only the pis such that rPðAjE ^ piÞ.
This explication, I submit, is less fit for Di Bello’s own purpose than the one proposed here. DB explicates
the notion of the resiliency of a conditional probability statement, while the informal requirement of
resiliency is that of a narrative. It’s not clear which conditional statement we should assess in terms of
DB-resiliency to obtain the resiliency of a given narrative. Perhaps one could try to say that it’s the
conditional probability of the verdict conditional on the narration, but that wouldn’t capture the intuition
that it is possible objections against the narration that should be considered, and so the narration itself
shouldn’t be kept fixed as a condition with respect to which conditional probability of new evidence is
assessed.
DB-resiliency is relative to a set of propositions R containing challenges, objections, and counter-
evidence. One difficulty is that even if we knew how to interpret the resiliency of a narration in terms of
the resiliency of a conditional statement, we’d need to be more specific about which R to pick as the
background for our resiliency assessment. It can’t be the currently available challenges, objections and
counter-evidence, because they were considered already in our assessment of a narration. It can’t be all
possible challenges, objections and counter-evidence, because in practice no one considers all possible
ones, and the notion would definitely fail to be operational. Presumably, it’s the non-negligible ones that
can change the verdict—but the explication given in the paper is much clearer about this and builds this
into the formal definition instead of leaving this in a commentary at a meta-level. A related difficulty is
that using R as a catch-all set containing possible evidence and challenges puts together factors that
should be kept apart. The explication proposed in this paper is clearer on this distinction.
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(as understood in this paper) to causal ones is too restrictive. A narration, while
perhaps containing a causal core, might also contain arguments about other
narrations, counter-arguments to arguments contained in other narrations, and so on,
so that it is quite impossible to find a finite collection of causal schemata that a
narration of a crime should fit.
8 Comparison to existing approaches
Now that the framework has been presented, I can briefly relate it to the existing
approaches. I rely on the distinction present in Verheij et al. (2016), with the
addition of the fourth element. Roughly, we can distinguish the following formal
normative approaches to fact-finding in the court of law:
Probabilistic
approaches,
which have already been discussed in this paper. What I
haven’t discussed is the increase in the use of Bayesian
networks in the modeling of evidence evaluation [see e.g.
Riesen and Serpen (2008), Keppens (2012), Gittelson et al.
(2013), Vlek et al. (2014), Vlek et al. (2016)]. While there is
no tension between representing probabilistic reasoning by a
Bayesian network and thinking of the decision process in
terms of the framework developed in this paper, a full
discussion of the issue lies beyond the scope of the paper.
Argumentative
approaches,
which focus on arguments based on evidence, meant to
support or attack conclusions. The approach is inspired by
Wigmore (1913), and heavily relies on diagrams of the
structure of arguments (Anderson 2007; Bex et al. 2003),
nowadays used in argument mapping software tools (Verheij
2007).
Narrative
approaches,
which also have been discussed in this paper. What I haven’t
mentioned is that recently the approach has been subjected to
computational research (Bex and Verheij 2013).
Mixed approaches, which draw from resources of any type to develop a more
unified framework in the conviction that there is no real
disagreement between the approaches (Spottswood 2013)—
rather they focus on different aspects of a rather complicated
process (Shen et al. 2006; Bex et al. 2010; Vlek et al. 2014;
Verheij 2014, 2017; Verheij et al. 2016).
Bayesian networks have proven useful, both in the evaluation of evidence and in
the presentation thereof, especially in situations when multiple pieces of evidence
need to be taken under consideration (Fenton and Neil 2011, 2014; Lagnado et al.
2013; Fenton et al. 2013, 2014; Gittelson et al. 2013). However, the main
motivations for introducing narrations into the picture still hold, and indeed
progress in this direction has been made (Vlek et al. 2014, 2016; Vlek 2016). My
conjecture is that the current framework is susceptible to Bayesian network analysis,
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and so can be seen as a contribution towards increasing the power of the Bayesian
paradigm and defending the paradigm against those objections.
The probabilistic approach has been criticized for the disparity between the
probabilistic predictions of the result of evidence evaluation, and the actual results
of such evaluation by real agents. Seemingly, the results of Bayesian condition-
alization upon all pieces of evidence are not the same as the results of real agents
getting acquainted with the evidence, developing various narratives of what
happened, and evaluating a hypothesis in light of such developments (Pennington
and Hastie 1991, 1992). While this quite hastily has been interpreted as indicating
that real agents aren’t even approximately Bayesian agents, the framework
developed in this paper indicates a more sensible interpretation of the apparent
disparity. For indeed, from the perspective of this paper, the ultimate evaluation of a
hypothesis is not merely the result of conditioning on all pieces of evidence. It is the
result of conditioning on all pieces of evidence and on other factors: what arguments
have been given, what narrations have been presented, what potential explanations
are available, what conditions narrations under consideration have etc. Thus, even
from the Bayesian perspective, there is no surprise that mere conditioning on pieces
of evidence is not the same as final evaluation.
Argumentative approaches employ the toolbox of defeasible logics (Prakken
1997; Prakken and Vreeswijk 2001) to formalize evidence evaluation and fact-
finding from purely qualitative perspective. Instead of using numerical values to
evaluate strength of support of a conclusion by evidence, one rather asks whether a
conclusion follows from the evidence by means of a defeasible argument scheme,
and whether it is not opposed by other arguments.24 For instance, reasoning from
expert opinion is said to use the following scheme:
Source E is an expert in domainD:
E asserts that the propositionA is to be known:
A is withinD:
Therefore;Amay plausibly be taken to be true:
and with each argumentation scheme comes a selection of critical questions that
need to be considered for the scheme to be applicable (e.g. ‘‘How credible is E as an
expert?’’, ‘‘Is A consistent with what other experts say?’’).
The computational outcome of the approach is the development of sense-making
software systems (Bex et al. 2007), which unlike knowledge bases do not require
background database, but rather assist the user in arranging arguments and
evaluating how they relate to each other, and force the users themselves to explicate
all background assumptions needed for the inference.
The approach allows for a quick-and-dirty analysis of the arguments involved
and their interplay, and is quite helpful in modeling uncontroversial cases of
argument comparisons without getting bogged down with numbers. The purely
qualitative approach and this level of abstraction, however, have their price. The
24 Strictly speaking, when opposing an argument a, there is a distinction between a rebutting argument
for the negation of the conclusion of a, and an undercutting argument, against the entailment relation of
a holding.
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approach doesn’t handle different modalities of support (Bex et al. 2007, 140) and it
doesn’t handle various comparisons of strength very well.25;26 It’s also not clear if
sufficient extent of applicability of the approach can be achieved by hand-picking a
selection of very concrete argument schemata; this is even less obvious when it
comes to attempts to list causal stories schemata (Bex et al. 2009).27
Arguments and narrations are combined in a hybrid theory (Bex et al. 2010; Bex
and Verheij 2013)—this, however, isn’t too related to narrations as conceived in this
paper. The narrative aspect in the hybrid approach is understood mainly to consist in
the availability of causal rules of inference and causal story schemata in an
argumentative framework, and no general epistemic conditions of the sort of the
ones discussed in this paper are brought up.28 While it is mentioned that a
consideration of alternative stories is desirable, the formal framework developed is
capable of modeling the development within a narration, not of selecting the
convicting narration from among many.
Probabilistic aspects and argumentation schemata are brought together in
Keppens (2014), where the idea is to use argumentation schemata together with
natural questions associated with them to evaluate and direct the development of a
probabilistic argument. In contrast with the current approach, as in the works of
Bex, the focus of Keppens (2014) is on the developments within a certain
explanation or narration, rather than on a more abstract general epistemological
framework explicating how competing narrations are compared and evaluated. The
point also holds for the work of Shen et al. (2006), where Bayesian networks are
25 For instance, Bex et al. (2007, 154) suggest that the extent to which hypotheses explain evidence
should be compared in terms of subset relation between sets of pieces of evidence explained by the
compared hypotheses (a similar idea is present in Verheij et al. (2016, 16). This is quite crude. Some
pieces of evidence might be more important than others, and simply counting items of evidence won’t do
the job. Moreover, the method highly susceptible to syntactic manipulation: is a DNA match a single
piece of evidence or is it composed of multiple sentences describing various facts that together constitute
a match? See also Vlek et al. (2014, 414) for a similar criticism.
26 To give another example, Bex et al. (2009, 87) represent agents’ motivations to act by having a set of
motivations for each agent, so that every transition between two states is either promoted, demoted, or is
neutral with respect to each motivation. It seems unlikely that the complexity of human decisions and the
interplay of motivations humans have can be captured by such ternary structures.
27 For instance one schema discussed by Bex et al. (2009, 82) informs us that certain circumstances S are
explained by the performance of an action A in some previous circumstances R with motivation M. This,
while perhaps true, is too generic to be helpful in guiding our pursuit of truth. On the other hand, finding
all sensible and useful instantiations that could be informatively applied in fact-finding in court, might be
a tricky endeavor, given the complexity and non-uniformity of human affairs. People do all kinds of stuff
for all kinds of reasons, and these dependencies are not obviously to be completely described by a finite
list of schemata anytime soon.
28 This is also another example of how qualitative approach comes at a price. The extent to which the
evidence supports or contradicts a story is measured by the size of the set of evidence supporting or
contradicting it (Bex et al. 2010, 145). Another aspect in which the approach might be a bit too crude is
that the notion of the completeness of a story is defined relative to a factual story scheme, such as ‘‘x is at
place p, x has motive m to kill y, shoots y, x shoots y )C y dies, y dies’’ (Bex and Verheij 2013, 261). No
real narration would be considered complete simply in virtue of filling in the blanks in such a simple
schema, and no general recipe of identifying the right schema to evaluate a narration is given—quite
likely, real life surpasses whatever finite amount of causal schemata one can come up with.
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used to represent a scenario, and entropy minimization is used to guide further
search for evidence.
The approach which is most similar to the one developed in this paper is by
Verheij Verheij (2014), Verheij et al. (2016), Verheij (2017), whose goal is to
develop an integrated perspective on all three approaches. In Verheij (2014), a
robbery case is described in terms of the procession of probabilistically evaluated
assemblies of hypotheses, so that from eight initially equally likely hypotheses, after
updating on evidence, only one remains standing. From this perspective scenarios
are competing hypotheses supported to various degrees by arguments based on
evidence, and leading to expectations of further pieces of evidence, hopefully
leading to the singling out of one hypothesis that is left standing. The framework of
the present paper is very much in the spirit of this approach. I’ll just briefly mention
key differences:
• Verheij (2014) discusses the competition of various single-sentence hypotheses;
the current framework investigates the competition of various explanations, seen
as theories composed of multiple claims.
• Verheij is very generous in his use of extreme probabilities of 1 and 0. For
instance, once it is seen in surveillance camera that a suspect has a tattoo, the
probability of a suspect having this tattoo is taken to be 1. Similarly, for two
hypotheses to exclude each other, their joint probability on evidence has to be 0.
And, crucially, conviction requires that the hypothesis relied in conviction
should have probability 1 given the evidence, and any probability less than 1 is a
reason for doubt. In contrast, my approach uses somewhat underspecified
thresholds which are not 1 or 0. I don’t find Verheij’s generosity advisable for
the following reasons. First, credences of 0 or 1 are not revisable. Once your
credence in A is 1 (or 0), no amount of evidence will ever lead you to
abandoning this position, if you’re to update using Bayesian methods. In
contrast, most court decisions are revisable; otherwise the institution of appeal
wouldn’t make sense. Second, this generosity might be epistemologically too
optimistic. Suppose you want to obey the following restriction: if you’re more
certain of A than of B, your subjective probability of A should be higher than that
of B. Now, my intuition is that I am more certain that 2 ? 2 = 4 than I am that
the White House is in Washington. After all, I might have fallen prey to some
educational conspiracy or mistake regarding the location of the White House.
So, my subjective probability of the White House is in Washington should be
less than 1. The argument generalizes to the distinction between mathematical
and empirical truths in general. The latter seem less certain than the former, and
so, one might want to attach subjective probability of less than 1 to them. With
regard to human affairs and mundane facts we never have justification and
evidence comparable to that of mathematical truths, so assigning 1 to a claim
about a crime and putting it on a par with 2þ 2 ¼ 4 might conflate importantly
different levels of conviction (note also many past convictions based on DNA
matches where the ultimate guilt probability was less than 1).
• Scenarios, as considered in Verheij’s hybrid theory (Verheij et al. 2016) are
more specifically circumscribed. They are causal stories whose elements are
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connected by causal rules of inference (as conceived in purely argumentative
approaches). In contrast, narratives in this paper are conceived as theories—sets
of sentences, which may contain causal claims, but also many other claims,
including information about what other narrations are.
• Given how Verheij’s approach is inspired by the argumentative and the narrower
notion of a story, an important role in it is played by evidential or causal rules of
inference. One advantage of this approach is that the possession of an explicit
list of sensible defeasible rules of inference together with questions that should
be posed when they are applied might be of high practical utility. On the other
hand, this piecemeal approach faces the practical challenge of actually providing
a useful and fairly complete collection of such rules. The approach developed in
this paper, in contrast, abstracts from rules of inference—the job that they’re
supposed to perform, is performed by prior conditional credences. Of course,
this is a clear trade-off between theoretical unity and practical utility.
One more issue deserves a brief discussion: the extent to which other formal
approaches have incorporated anything resembling the requirements introduced in
this paper. Conditions on narrations other than related to evidential support have
only recently been discussed in a formalized manner. As far as I am aware, all
existing formal approaches are inspired not by Di Bello (2013), but by much more
vague and less detailed (Pennington and Hastie 1991, 1993), who somewhat in
passing mention their criteria in opposition to the Bayesian approach: conclusive-
ness (plausibility), coherence and completeness.
Conclusiveness in Verheij (2017) is identified with maximal plausibility
understood as having probability 1. I already discussed why this might not be the
best strategy—let me just add that in the present approach conclusiveness is rather
captured jointly by quite a number of different requirements, high (but not = 1)
probability given background knowledge and evidence being only one of them.
Verheij (2017) identifies coherence of a narration with its logical consistency. In
the present approach, the requirement is replaced by (Initial plausibility), which is
stronger (no contradictory narration can have prior greater than 0 anyway), and
improves the cognitive efficiency of competing narration evaluation—there is no
point in considering merely consistent narrations which, given what we know and
evidence, are too improbable to be taken seriously.
Completeness of a case in Verheij (2017) is identified as being-logically-most-
specific case in the class of cases under consideration given the evidence. This, it
seems, has the undesirable feature that a case might be considered complete simply
because no more complete case has been presented; in contrast, on the present
approach, the notion of incompleteness of a narration, as explicated by (Gaps), is
not so constrained by the list of available narrations, but rather driven by natural
expectations given the content of a narration, legitimate priors, and the evidence
available.
A somewhat different approach to completeness, more akin to that developed
from the argumentative perspective, has been developed in Vlek et al. (2016) by
means of the framework of Bayesian networks. The key element of the approach is
called a scenario idiom, which is a specific fragment of a Bayesian network. For
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instance, Vlek et al. (2016, 293) a murder scenario idiom is composed of four sub-
nodes: X had motive; X killed Y; X had opportunity; and Death of Y. A sce-
nario is said to be complete if it fits and completes a scenario scheme idiom (that is,
for every node in the scenario scheme idiom, there is some corresponding
proposition in the scenario).
While scenario idioms might be useful for guiding the development of a
Bayesian network, it’s rather unlikely that a scenario of a murder will become
intuitively complete merely in virtue of being composed of four sentences
corresponding to these nodes, and in general the concerns from footnote 28 apply. In
contrast, the current approach puts the effort of finding gaps in asking if there are
natural questions that a narration should answer, given legitimate priors and the
evidence. Clearly, no finite list of natural questions fitting all possible cases is
forthcoming, but if human affairs are too complicated for one to become available,
so be it.
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